Future of Louisiana Charity Hospitals Unclear 4

By Daniel T. Smith

The Alexandria Town Talk ran an article this week about the proposal to rebuild the Huey P. Long Medical Center, which is part of the state’s network of charity hospitals. Nearly $13 million has been marked for the project in the state budget. State Rep. Israel B. Curtis (D-Atown) explains that because the source for the funding has yet to be determined, the fate of the proposal lies in the upcoming legislative session.

The future of Huey P. Long brings home a statewide debate on reforming health care, which has focused primarily on a saga of political wrangling in New Orleans and Baton Rouge. Last week, Governor Blanco made headlines when a consulting company she contracted released the most ambitious plans to date for a joint VA/LSU medical complex in downtown New Orleans.

In its most recent form, the proposed LSU training hospital would replace Charity and University Hospitals with a $1.2 billion 484-bed medical complex, which would include a trauma center and top-notch facilities for neurosurgery and orthopedics. In addition to providing basic care for the uninsured, the plan calls for a state of the art hospital large enough to attract more insured (and thereby paying) customers. The hospital could pay off its cost, $400 million of which comes from federal funds ($300 million of Community Development Block Grants has been set aside by Blanco’s Louisiana Recovery Authority).

LSU currently administers the network of charity hospitals in Louisiana, including the Huey P. Long Medical Center in Central Louisiana. In order to save money on administrative and facility expenses, the LSU hospital would be built adjacent to a new VA Hospital in what would become the cornerstone of a revitalized medical center in Orleans Parish. $600 million federal dollars have already been approved for a VA hospital.

Obstacles and opposition to building the new facility are widespread. Republican U.S. Senator David Vitter wants hundreds of millions of Medicaid dollars, which previously went to Charity Hospital, to instead be used to purchase private insurance for the uninsured. This would open them to seeking medical services from private hospitals. Small businesses that do not offer employee health insurance could also have to pay into the system.

Senate Health and Welfare Committee head Joe McPherson (D-Wordworth), who has filed a bill (SB 1) to steer the uninsured to government managed health care focused on prevention and primary care, believes that Vitter’s plan would cost the state an extra half billion dollars per year for the New Orleans area alone.

Moreover, as CEO of the LSU Health Care Services Division Donald Smithburg points out, the new hospital does not follow the mistakes of the past:

LSU has repeatedly and emphatically declared that it has no plans to construct and operate the new hospital using the old charity system model. On the contrary, LSU strives to create a 21st century academic medical center to support its mission of patient care, medical education, trauma services and furthering research. We will do so in a cost-saving partnership with the VA, which already has its funding appropriated through Congress.

Any verifiable health reform that truly helps small business and the uninsured citizens of our region will complement a teaching hospital, which will always be an anchor of New Orleans health care.

Senator Vitter said the new LSU training hospital would be “a proposed very big charity that costs 12 times more than any previous estimate,” a clear hyperbole for which he has been taken to task by the Daily Kingfish.

U.S. Rep. Richard Baker (R-Baton Rouge) opposes the hospital complex in downtown New Orleans on the grounds that the state might use eminent domain as a last resort for securing land for the hospital.

The Bush Administration has long been against a federal partnership for a charity hospital in downtown New Orleans. Bush’s Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt has called for replacing the Louisiana charity hospital system with private insurance vouchers. Some see the old system as ineffective (Huey P. Long was instructed to make improvements as late as 2003, but in 2006 it was found to have satisfactory standards).

On the other hand, Louisiana Health and Hospitals Secretary Fred Cerise

said the insurance model won’t work unless the state fixes the underlying health-care delivery system. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans area had far too many doctors and hospital beds, one reason its private-sector health care system had the highest costs and worst quality outcomes in the country.

Sparring between the federal and state governments, and between the LRA and the Louisiana Legislature (which decided to authorize the full $300 million of CDBGs before it didn’t before it did again), led Governor Blanco to state, “These administration games over the Leavitt plan could cost the people of southeast Louisiana a golden opportunity.” This was near the time it became known that the VA was beginning to consider other areas.

Over a month ago, U.S. Rep. Jeff Miller (R-Florida) began to publicly suggest that the New Orleans Veterans Hospital should be relocated to western Florida. Department of Veterans Affairs Secretary Jim Nicholson repeated the VA’s commitment to the Greater New Orleans area, but

Asked if he was looking at sites outside the downtown area, where Louisiana State University wants to build its proposed hospital, Nicholson said, “We are going to be. We are putting out a request for proposals to look at sites that might be suggested to us to look at.

As the Louisiana Weekly points out, “to look at sites that might be suggested to us to look at” probably means Jefferson Parish. Collaboration between the VA hospital and an LSU training/charity facility could be accomplished in any number of ways, and the Department of Veterans Affairs doesn’t seem to care whether the two hospitals are even in the same area of Greater New Orleans.

The Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana has written that the state should strive to determine the hospital’s size and relationship with the region’s private medical sector.

In addition to David Vitter, organizations like The Louisiana Hospital Association and the Metropolitan Hospital Council are opposed to rebuilding a large charity hospital in New Orleans, presumably because the proposed public medical complex aims to attract a larger number of private hospitals’ paying customers than ever before. U.S. Rep. Bobby Jindal (R-Metairie), who worked in state health care for former Governor Mike Foster, has vowed to stay silent on the issue until after the legislative session ends this summer. Another organization, the Coalition of Leaders for Louisiana Health Care (of which Ochsner is a part), has been working on a proposal based on the suggestions of Leavitt and Vitter. Like Jindal, it too will not be ready to speak until sometime in June.

McPherson has expressed skepticism over the motives of a coalition of businessmen and politicians who are joined in opposing the hospital:

I don’t think a congressman or a legislator or an insurance salesman should be dictating what kind of new hospital should be built. That’s a job for experts in the design and engineering field on the advice of expert consultants.

Senate President Donald Hines (D-Bunkie) agrees. “There might be a strong desire for some of them to get their hands on the money and maybe outcomes are not their top priority.”

The upcoming legislative session holds the future of not only the Huey P. Long and New Orleans charity hospitals, but the ability of the state of Louisiana to provide care to its residents who can’t afford health insurance.

Should we read between the lines here? Is it relevant that David Vitter has received $636,000 dollars from health care professionals and $196,000 from the insurance industry? Are the Bush Administration and state Republicans collaborating with private hospitals and insurance companies to privatize Medicaid in Louisiana? Who really benefits from that type of policy? When Jindal breaks his silence, on who’s side can we expect him to fall?

Reposted from The Gambit Weekly: The Lee Street Riot and the Mystery of the 364th 7

For more on the Lee Street Riot, click here.

The Mystery of the 364th
Photos courtesy Termite Art Productions/History Channel

Some eyewitnesses say they saw a mass killing. The Army says nothing happened. Geoffrey F.X. O’Connell reveals the story behind an ongoing investigation into the fate of an all-black World War II regiment stationed at Camp Van Dorn, Miss.

Were a thousand African-American soldiers gunned down by the Army in a racially motivated shootout in Mississippi in 1943?

Were members of the controversial 364th (Negro) Infantry Regiment killed at Camp Van Dorn to silence their relentless – and sometimes violent – demands for equality in a segregated Army?

Were the bodies buried in a mass grave somewhere on the sprawling base or “stacked like cordwood” and shipped north on boxcars?

That’s a story that’s been whispered since World War II in and around Centreville, Miss. A Pentagon spokesman sums up its 1999 probe of the allegation: “Nothing egregious happened.” But that isn’t the end of it.

Historians and journalists – including this writer – in pursuit of this puzzling piece of American history are uncovering a nationwide trail of racial violence during World War II. Bloody clashes in the military brought with them an ever-escalating fear among whites and blacks that at least one such incident could spiral out of control.

Why are these stories only coming to light now, a half-century after they are said to have occurred? Several factors are responsible:

• After 50 years, millions of top-secret government documents from World War II were available to be declassified;

• Historians are incorporating oral accounts of ordinary citizens into their understanding of past events;

• Historians and journalists have come to accept that urban legends sometimes can be keys to society’s worst traumas. The white riot that leveled Tulsa’s black community in 1921 – with over 300 dead – was legend until just this year, when a state commission in the face of overwhelming evidence recommended reparation to victims’ families.

• World War II veterans at the ends of their lives are unburdening themselves of long-held secrets.

In February, New Orleans’ D-Day Museum – in cooperation with Tulane’s Amistad Research Center and The Eisenhower Center for American Studies at the University of New Orleans – hosted a first-ever national symposium on the African-American experience in World War II. Black vets celebrated their place in history, but also traded with historians stories of discrimination, protest and reprisal. Even keynote speaker Ossie Davis revealed a deadly racial incident he witnessed while stationed in Liberia. The symposium title, “Double Victory: Fighting on Two Fronts” alludes to a grassroots civil rights movement that called for “Victory at Home, Victory Abroad.” The movement had no leaders, but some of its adherents were so passionate that they burned or carved a “double V” on their chests.

“Troublemakers” in the controversial 364th Regiment had those “double Vs,” according to Army intelligence files.

Ridenhour investigates

The casualty count may be in dispute, but it is now clear that there were hundreds of bloody domestic firefights from Camp Benning, Ga., to Beaumont, Texas; from Ft. Dix, N.J., to Camp Shenango, Pa. Much of what we are learning about this racial violence is coming from documents that are part of a wartime domestic intelligence operation far more extensive and intrusive than what previously has been known. And much of what we don’t know about the period is the result of government press censorship – the proportions of which are not understood even today.

The late New Orleans journalist Ron Ridenhour was nine years into his research on alleged killings at Camp Van Dorn when he died of a heart attack in May 1998. The award-winning investigative reporter – perhaps best known as the soldier whose letters to Congress prompted investigation into the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War – had recorded interviews with dozens of white and black soldiers and base civilians about the alleged incident.

Some interviewees swore they witnessed a shootout, or events they think led to a shootout or its aftermath. Some say the casualties were many, others say just a few. Some testimony claims to be first-hand, some is hearsay.

Through the Freedom of Information Act, Ridenhour had tens of thousands of government documents released. At the time of his death, they added up to an intriguing but purely circumstantial case pointing to the deaths and disappearances of at least some members of the 364th. Ridenhour knew much more investigation was needed to discover what really happened.

Ridenhour’s has been the most thorough pursuit of the story so far, but others, like Mississippian Carroll Case before him, and documentary producer Greg DeHart after him, continue to raise questions about this incident and the cauldron of racial tension that was roiling in the early years of World War II. The latest installment in this ongoing controversy is DeHart’s upcoming History Channel documentary The Mystery of the 364th, scheduled to premiere 9 p.m. May 20. This hour-long program neither proves the allegations nor puts them to rest. It does, however, support the contention that there are serious issues here that deserve a robust public debate.

The path of this story to The History Channel began with former McComb, Miss., banker Carroll Case, who first heard the tale of wholesale killing of blacks at Camp Van Dorn from a former MP who said he was one of the shooters. Case pursued the story on his own for five years, then, in 1990, passed copies of his files to Ridenhour. Ridenhour was in the thick of his investigation when he died. Following Ridenhour’s death, Case penned his own book on the subject, a mix of fact and fiction called The Slaughter: An American Atrocity.

The controversial and oft-maligned book caught the attention of the NAACP. The organization was shocked by the magnitude of Case’s allegation that 1,200 African-American combat troops were killed by white soldiers in a single night of fighting in southwest Mississippi in the summer or fall of 1943.

Due to pressure from Mississippi Congressman Bennie Thompson and the NAACP, which issued its own draft report on the subject in June 1999, the Army says it “was forced to respond” to inquiries about the book’s allegations. It committed thousands of hours and hundreds of thousand of dollars on a report released Dec. 23, 1999. The Army’s conclusion: “All available material clearly supports the conclusion no incident such as that described in The Slaughter could have taken place.”

Brig. Gen Brown, Chief of Military History, concluded: “This work has been accomplished with a rigor that should readily stand public or academic scrutiny.”

William Leftwich III, deputy defense secretary for equal opportunity, spoke to the press more forcefully: “With what we have done, the DOD and the Army … have put a stake in the heart of this vicious, maniacal … rumor.”

The Army report did not kill this “rumor.” The allegations are not laid to rest because the report does not pass scrutiny. Critics – including this writer – say the report is riddled with factual errors, marred by gaps and suffers from internal contradictions and conflicts with other Army records.

Here are two examples of such conflicts. In the narrative section of the report, the Army says a bloody riot in Phoenix involving members of the 364th prior to their arrival at Camp Van Dorn was the result of the regiment’s commander, Col. Wickham, serving too much beer to the black soldiers. Other declassified Army records indicate that Wickham had been relieved of his command at the time of the incident and was under medical observation in California on the day in question.

And in the report’s appendix, which is said to be a complete accounting of the enlisted men in the 364th, Pvt. William Walker is listed as “separated from service” – off the payroll – May 15, 1943. But Walker, according to the report’s main narrative, was shot and killed in uniform near the Camp Van Dorn gates two weeks later, on May 30.

When this writer created a database from the Army “roster,” dozens of these kinds of discrepancies emerged. Still, the report’s failure to end the debate should not be taken as an indication that the allegations are true, only that the controversy continues.

Not Colin Powell’s army

The military in World War II was not “Colin Powell’s Army,” as some call the integrated armed forces that saw the rise of a black man to high rank and national prominence. The mystery of the 364th – and the racial crisis of which it is emblematic – needs to be examined in light of the prejudices of the day.

The military was completely segregated, thoroughly “Jim Crow.” The Marines did not accept blacks at all. The Navy accepted them only for menial jobs. The Army reluctantly bowed to pressure and inducted some blacks into segregated units led by a white officer corps. Most black regiments were service units. Those few designated for combat were typically under-trained, under-supplied and sent to dreadful stations where they were isolated and subject to insult and attack from hostile, white civilians.

This prejudiced conduct was justified by Army War College studies like the so-called “Bly report,” issued in 1925, in response to racial problems in World War I. In among pseudo-scientific claptrap on the smaller “cranial cavities” of Negroes is this sweeping assertion: “The Negro does not perform his share of civil duties in time of peace. He has no leaders in industrial or commercial life. He takes no part in government. Compared to the white man he is admittedly of inferior mentality. He is inherently weak in character.”

With this as a blueprint, it is no surprise that despite the threat of a new world war, the military establishment resisted black participation. Some cities experienced riots when blacks were turned away from induction centers.

Though historians argue over Franklin Roosevelt’s political motives, the president appears in his declassified papers as adamant about a 10 percent quota for blacks in the Army as he was about his threat to withhold defense contracts from companies discriminating against blacks. White workers in shipyards from Mobile, Ala., to Chester, Pa., rioted against the president’s directives. In 1943 in Detroit, at about the same time the first race riots are reported at Camp Van Dorn, white workers enraged by black participation in the burgeoning war industry rioted for three days. The final toll: 25 blacks and nine whites were killed, hundreds injured, millions of dollars in damage.

The violent birth of a regiment

The 367th (Negro) Infantry Regiment – the forerunner of the 364th – was a rare early entrant to the pre-war preparations, activated as a black combat unit in March 1941 at Camp Claiborne, in central Louisiana just outside Alexandria. In December of that year, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Beneath the veneer of a country united in its hatred of the enemy, racial turmoil simmered.

Just one month after Pearl Harbor, violence flared in Alexandria. In a pattern that would repeat itself a frightening number of times in the years to follow, a black soldier in town with a pass was accused of accosting a white woman. He was set upon by police. His buddies fought back. Military police responded. People were killed and wounded and property destroyed.

How many were killed and how much was destroyed is itself still a subject of investigation and debate. Even the Army report at the time characterized the situation as a police riot. But one local newspaper reporter then, and investigators now, say that the Army understated the severity of the so-called “Lee Street riot” and undercounted losses. This minimization, some charge, is also part of the oft-repeated pattern.

At any rate, the 367th was broken up in March 1942. The official records of what happened are sketchy, contradictory and somewhat confusing. But so far, most researchers agree that the regiment’s First Battalion – about 1,000 enlisted men – received orders for overseas deployment. The remaining two battalions were re-designated the 364th (Negro) Infantry Regiment. It took in a batch of new recruits – mostly from Northern cities like Chicago, New York and Philadelphia – and were ordered to Arizona in June 1942.

By the fall, the full regiment was bivouacked at Papago Park in Phoenix. Letters from soldiers there and official Army investigations deplored the plight of the 364th both on base and in the hostile community surrounding it. A “John Doe” letter addressed to Pennsylvania Sen. Joseph Guffey summed up the situation: “If there is no change here, all of us from Pennsylvania have decided to go AWOL rather than be murdered in uniforms of the United States Army. Your delay, sir, can be the cause of a disgraceful consequence.”

Things were bad all over. A November 1942 memo to the Secretary of War from Truman Gibson, Civilian Aide to the Secretary, detailed “violent and abusive treatment of Negro military personnel by civilian public authorities in the South.” It listed incidents in Alexandria, La., Columbia, S.C., Norfolk, Va., Mobile and Montgomery, Ala., Beaumont, Texas and Little Rock, Ark. The memo concluded: “This continuing wave of violence may lead to rioting at any time and certainly it is raising havoc with the spirit of Negro soldiers, many of whom have reached the stage that they would rather fight their domestic enemies than the foreign foe.”

On Nov. 13, racially motivated fighting broke out involving the 364th at Papago Park. But it was nothing compared to what happened two weeks later on Thanksgiving night in downtown Phoenix.

The ‘Phoenix massacre’

Just as with the “Lee Street riot,” the details and body count of the “Phoenix Massacre” continue to be argued. A reporter for the Arizona Republic who covered the massacre told Ridenhour (himself a Phoenix native) that his access to the riot scene was restricted and that he always believed the body count was much higher than official reports.

In yet another aspect of a soon-to-be-repeated pattern, an initial altercation escalated when members of the 364th returned to camp, armed themselves and returned to Phoenix. All that is known for sure is that the firefight lasted all night over the predominantly black section of that desert town. Soldiers, police and civilians were killed and wounded. Court martials followed. The Congressional delegation urged the 364th be sent packing. The army agreed. But where?

Studies at the war’s onset warned that domestic racial problems posed a threat to troop mobilization and arms production and could lead to propaganda disasters. Agents for the Japanese, for example, were already promising Southern blacks – their “brothers in color” – freedom from white oppression, even economic rewards. Each report of racial violence that leaked out made its way to German and Japanese broadcasts to American soldiers overseas. A mid-war intelligence-led opinion survey suggested that 10 percent of the black population thought they would be better off under Japanese rule.

One study was adamant in its findings about the deployment of black troops: “… as little movement as possible be made into areas where racial relations are different from their home environment,” concluded “The Negro Problem in the Army,” circulated by Maj. Gen. Geo. Strong June 17, 1942.

This advice was not heeded when the most rebellious black combat unit the U.S. had ever seen was sent to the nation’s epicenter of racial hate and violence.

Letters claim killings

The 1999 Army report acknowledges a state of strained race relations as the 364th arrived by train in Centreville, Miss.: “To a majority it was a trip into a virtually unknown and foreign land where a man of color often had to fear for his life.” These fears, according to files Ridenhour had declassified, were not generic.

“Before the 364th came in, there were several unsolved murders of Negro soldiers. Their bodies were found in the field,” according to Cpl. Wilbur T. Jackson of the 512th Quartermaster Regiment, another segregated black unit. “All the white farmers and civilians are armed at all times and seem to want a pitched battle with Negro soldiers.”

In a memo forwarded to Truman Gibson, Acting Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, Jackson continued: “Men have been constantly molested and beaten by white MPs.” Jackson said he was willing to testify anywhere, anytime about what he has seen, concluding his memo: “I’d rather die for something I really did than to be shot down because some officer doesn’t like the way I walk, or the look on my face.”

Violent racial clashes began at Camp Van Dorn and in nearby towns within 24 hours of the arrival of the 364th. Though there is much debate about details, the record reflects some consensus truths:

• Soldiers of the 364th claimed they were going to “clean up” the base and surrounding towns, challenging Jim Crow laws at every turn;

• White civilians were heavily armed, braced for a violent clash;

• The Army high command in Washington warned base and regimental commanders that they were to end racial violence or lose their jobs;

• On May 30, within days of the arrival of the 364th, Pvt. William Walker, while scuffling with white MPs near the entrance to the base, was killed by the local sheriff;

• Members of Walker’s company, joined by others, broke into base storerooms, stole rifles and headed for Centreville, swearing revenge.

The largest newspaper in the region, The McComb Daily Enterprise, reported: “Many wild rumors floated about … rumors of men being killed by the scores and of women being molested. All efforts to run these rumors down did nothing more than emphasize the chaotic way the public has of reacting to emotional disturbances.”